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Abstract 
Brain damage of various aetiologies can lead to different disorders of consciousness 
(DOC), varying from coma to vegetative, to minimally conscious states. Each state 
is characterised by a different degree of wakefulness, awareness, pain sensitivity and 
is differentially handled with respect to treatment, ethical considerations and end-of-
life decisions. Thus, its correct identification is crucial while devising or modulating 
appropriate treatment strategies. Actually, the main coma scales cannot always accurately 
determine the state of consciousness of an individual, while other tools (e.g. imaging 
techniques) present a certain degree of uncertainty. A complementary approach may be 
constituted by a 24-hour observation of patients, for a sufficient period of days, using 
an ad hoc behavioural scale, further correlated with physiological and pharmacological 
parameters measured on patients. The method herein described might help recognising 
the presence of consciousness of the different DOC patients, and thus discerning a 
vegetative from a minimally conscious state.
DEFiniTiOn OF COnSCiOuSnESS
Among the various causes of brain damage, the 
most common are of traumatic, hemorrhagic-ischem-
ic and metabolic nature (drugs, excess of insulin, 
diabetes, ethanol) [1]. Before partial or full recovery 
from severe brain damage, survivors classically go 
through different clinical entities, generally referred 
to as disorders of consciousness (DOC) [2, 3]. Defin-
ing consciousness and its implications, however, is a 
difficult task.
The concept of consciousness has been approached 
from numerous disciplines, ranging from philosophy 
to psychology to medicine and neuroscience. These 
differential approaches have resulted in numerous 
definitions and considerations. According to La-
borit [4], consciousness arises from the interaction 
among multiple factors, such as imagination (which 
is a mechanism of escape from the problems of re-
ality), autonomic nervous system automatisms and 
the unconscious part of the mind. From a cognitive 
neuroscience point of view, consciousness recalls no-
tions like awareness, wakefulness and attention. A 
simple definition of consciousness often states that 
consciousness is the ability to be aware of them-
selves and surroundings [1]. Again, consciousness 
is defined resting upon its capability of allowing the 
discrimination between self and external objects and 
events. Consciousness has, obviously, a neural coun-
terpart, i.e. neural pathways involving several brain 
regions (neural basis of consciousness). From a neu-
ral point of view, consciousness might be regarded as 
an emergent property depending on complex inter-
actions between cortex/forebrain, limbic system and 
brainstem [5].
A number of neuroanatomical and neurophysi-
ological considerations indicate where conscience may 
reside. For instance, various cell groups in the brain-
stem modulate wakefulness by ascending projections 
to the cerebral cortex [6]. Also, there are presumably 
glutaminergic projections from the classical reticular 
ponto-mesencephalic nuclei to the intralaminar nuclei 
of the thalamus, which in turn project to large areas 
of the cerebral cortex. As a rule, the ascending reticu-
lar activating system is considered one of the crucial 
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systems involved in the arousal and wakefulness state 
(Figure 1) [6].
Plum and Posner, who along with Jennet first de-
scribed the locked-in syndrome and the vegetative 
state during the 1960s and the 1970s [7, 8], con-
sider consciousness as a state of constant awareness 
of themselves and their environment, with preserved 
responsiveness to external stimuli. As a result, con-
sciousness constitutes a distinct entity compared to 
vigilance/alert/arousal. Specifically, an individual may 
be alerted, awake, with eyes open, but not conscious, 
unaware (in whole or in part) of his surroundings, and 
unable to react appropriately to stimuli received from 
the environment [9].
Thus, consciousness is not an all-or-nothing phenom-
enon and its clinical assessment relies on inferences 
made from responses to external stimuli that are ob-
served at the time of the examination [10]. Current 
tools do not allow measuring consciousness objectively 
and unequivocally [11].
nOSOgrAPhy AnD iDEnTiFiCATiOn 
OF COMA, vEgETATivE AnD MiniMALLy 
COnSCiOuS STATES
Disorders of consciousness (DOC) have been di-
vided into different nosological categories/states [12]. 
Coma is typically characterised by the absence of arous-
al (and thereby consciousness) and often referred to as 
unarousable unresponsiveness (Figure 2).
The recovery of spontaneous or elicited eye-opening, 
in the absence of voluntary motor activity, marks the 
transition from coma to vegetative state (VS). VS is 
characterised by wakefulness without awareness, no in-
teraction with the environment and it typically follows 
a coma; after one month the term persistent vegetative 
state is used; after three months for a non-traumatic 
insult or one year for a traumatic insult some authors 
use the term permanent vegetative state, which implies 
no chance of recovery (Figure 3).
Signs of voluntary motor activity are indicative of a 
minimally conscious state (MCS). The transition from 
VS to MCS is characterised by the appearance of vol-
untary reproducible behaviours, such as performing 
simple commands, “yes/no” verbal or gestural answer-
ing (regardless of accuracy), understandable verbaliza-
tion, motor activity that occur in relation to emotionally 
relevant stimuli (including eye-movement research or 
continue monitoring with the eye/eyes). To be mini-
mally conscious, patients have to show limited but clear 
evidence of awareness of themselves and/or their envi-
ronment.
To emerge from the MCS, a functional communi-
cation or the use of objects is necessary [8]. The term 
functional communication means that the language 
plays a useful function for the person using it and that it 
allows changing the social environment in a predictable 
and controllable way. MCS, for which no generally ac-
cepted standards of care have been proposed [8], is one 
of the most sensitive categories to recognise, whereby 
clinical studies [11] have shown how difficult it is to 
distinguish between reflex/automatic movements and 
voluntary movements [13]. This difficulty results in an 
Figure 1
The ascending reticular activating system is responsible for 
arousal and wakefulness. Adapted from [6].
Figure 2
Awareness and wakefulness can be considered the two prin-
cipal components of consciousness. Normal individuals show 
a positive correlation between awareness and wakefulness in 
all their physiological states, contrarily to what happens in the 
different DOC states. Adapted from [10].
Figure 3
Flow chart of the course of a brain injury. Adapted from [10].
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underestimation of behavioural signs of consciousness 
and hence misdiagnosis, which is estimated to occur in 
about one-third to nearly half of chronically vegetative 
patients [8]. Clinical testing for the absence of con-
sciousness in VS is much more ambiguous then testing 
for absence of wakefulness in coma. VS is one end of 
a spectrum of awareness and the subtle differential di-
agnosis with MCS necessitates repeated evaluations by 
skilled examiners.
COMA SCALES: ADvAnTAgES 
AnD LiMiTATiOnS
The improvement of medical techniques of reani-
mation, from 1960s onwards, resulted in an increased 
number of patients surviving traumatic or hypoxic-is-
chemic brain injuries. As a consequence, various scales 
for identification of the state of DOC have been de-
veloped, providing a valuable diagnostic tool. Use of 
these scales often relies upon the ability of the observer 
to accurately and consistently assess the patient. The 
number of existing scales is remarkably high and a de-
tailed description of all of them would extend beyond 
the scopes of the present review. We therefore decided 
to focus on a subset of scales frequently used in hospital 
settings.
Some scales were developed for a specific use or 
scope, while others are more general. In general, scales 
describe the symptoms of the patients (clinical ap-
proach, used by the clinical staff). Examples of symp-
toms are the verbalisation, the vegetative functions or 
the amount of damage linked to the trauma. Each scale 
is specific to one or more particular symptoms. Along 
with the clinical approach, there is also a behavioural 
approach, whose aim is to study the phenomenon as a 
whole. Behavioural analysis contemplates the state of 
DOC patients with a descriptive approach, not neces-
sarily targeted toward a specific symptom but approach-
ing it from a more general perspective.
Currently, there is no unique scale universally adopt-
ed for all the various stages of coma and the problems 
related to them, and patients have to be stimulated to 
determine their category of coma.
The most widespread coma scale in Europe is the 
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), a nosographic and neuro-
logical scale assessing the functional status of the cen-
tral nervous system, along with the consciousness of a 
person in a DOC state. This scale, published in 1974 by 
Teasdale and Jennett [14], was initially developed to as-
sess level of consciousness after traumatic head injury. 
Its score is obtained from three different tests, assessing 
eye, verbal and motor responses, and it varies between 
3 (deep coma or death) and 14 (or 15, in its revised ver-
sion, for a fully awake person). The GCS is often paired 
to a similar American scale, the Rancho Los Amigos 
Levels of Cognitive Functioning Scale (LOCF), whose 
score ranges from 1 (non-responsive cognitive function-
ing) to 8 (normal cognitive functioning).
Another important tool, the Wessex Head Injury Ma-
trix (WHIM), was developed by Shiel et al. to monitor 
all stages of recovery from coma to rehabilitation [15] 
and consists in a 62 items scale, ordered in a hierarchical 
way (following the order of appearance observed during 
recovery) and divided into 6 subscales (communica-
tion, attention, social behaviour, concentration, visual 
awareness, and cognition). A validation study, conduct-
ed by Majerus et al. [16], evidenced the effectiveness 
of this scale in monitoring subtle changes in patients 
emerging from the VS and those in a MCS. Compared 
to the GCS, which has proven extremely useful in the 
very acute stages of coma, the WHIM seems charac-
terized by a higher degree of flexibility. On the other 
hand, the validation study also evidenced the limits of 
the sequence of recovery proposed by Shiel et al., as the 
proposed order of recovery could not be replicated for 
all items of the scale [16].
Another important scale was specifically developed 
to identify patients emerging from MCS and differenti-
ate them from those in VS: the Coma Recovery Scale 
Revised (CRS-R). The latter has a structure similar to 
the GCS, with very detailed subscales assessing arous-
al, auditory, visual, motor and oromotor capabilities, 
and verbal communication, with a score ranging from 
0 (worst) to 23 (best). Such level of detail allows the 
identification of subtle signs of recovery of conscious-
ness [2]; yet, its use is heavily time consuming (due to 
the clinical nature of the assessment) and therefore of 
limited feasibility in the intensive care setting [17].
Wijdicks et al. proposed an alternative to the GCS 
[18]: the full outline of unresponsiveness (FOUR) 
scale, which tests four components (eye, motor, brain-
stem reflexes and respiratory function), with a score 
ranging from 0 to 4 (a 0 score in all the four categories 
meaning brain death). The FOUR score is able to pro-
vide greater neurological details than the GCS [18]. In 
particular, the scale tests induced eye movements and 
for this reason it can be employed in the early recog-
nition of a locked-in syndrome (LIS). Moreover, the 
FOUR is intended to address eye tracking of a mov-
ing object, one of the most important signs indicating 
the transition to a MCS [11]. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that the evaluation of brainstem reflexes, by 
testing pupil, cornea and cough reflexes, as well as the 
evaluation of respiratory function, may result complex 
for untrained hospital personnel [3].
Beside these general scales, a number of other scales 
were already in use or were developed, in order to cover 
more specific aspects or to try and complement their 
limitations. Below we report a brief description of some 
of these scales. The Hunt and Hess scale [19] was intro-
duced in 1968 to classify the severity of a subarachnoid 
haemorrhage (SAH) based on the patient’s clinical con-
dition but it is now used less frequently and has gener-
ally been replaced by the World Federation of Neuro-
surgical Societies classification (WFNS SAH Grading 
Scale), which uses the GCS and focal neurological 
deficit to assess severity of symptoms of SAH [20]. The 
Fisher Grading Scale on Relation of SAH to Vasospasm 
uses the computed tomography (CT) to classify the ap-
pearance of subarachnoid haemorrhage [21]. This scale 
has been further modified by Claassen et al. to take into 
account the effects of intraventricular or intracerebral 
hemorrhages [22]. Haemorrhages may also be caused 
by abnormalities of the vascular structures or arterio-
venous malformations (AVM), which can occur in the 
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brain or along the spinal cord. The pressure of the blood 
flow can also lead to the formation of aneurysms. The 
Spetzler Martin Grading Scale evaluates the risk of sur-
gery for a patient with AVM. The scale gives a score 
between 1 and 6, a grade 1 AVM being considered as 
low risk for surgery, while grade 6 AVM is considered as 
not operable [23]. In general, brain injured patients at 
higher risk of deterioration or mortality are identified 
using CT scans. One of the most widely reported CT 
grading systems is the Marshall classification [24].
The Sensory Modality Assessment and Rehabilita-
tion Technique (SMART) is a tool to measure levels of 
sensory, motor and communicative responses, in order 
to assess patient’s awareness [25]. As for acute stroke 
patients, the National Institutes of Health Stroke 
Scale (NIHSS) was developed to provide a quantita-
tive evaluation of their neurological status. Using a 15-
item neurologic examination stroke scale, which can be 
performed in less than 10 minutes, a trained observer 
evaluates parameters such as level of consciousness, 
language, extraocular movements and visual-field loss, 
motor strength, ataxia, dysarthria and sensory loss [26]. 
The scale represents several different neurological defi-
cits upon a single axis, valued by a score from 0 to 30, 
higher scores indicating a large stroke and lower scores 
indicating a small stroke. The Western neuro sensory 
stimulation profile (WNSSP) is another tool developed 
to assess cognitive functions in severely impaired head-
injured patients and a prognostic tool for slow-to-recov-
er patients. It consists of 32 items whose scores are suf-
ficiently broad to demonstrate patients’ improvement 
in arousal/attention, expressive communication, and in 
the response to auditory, visual, tactile, and olfactory 
stimulation [27].
The first scale to be defined for sedated patients is the 
Ramsay Sedation Scale (RSS), a scale designed to define 
the grade of arousal of the patients, consisting of six dif-
ferent levels of sedation [28]. An additional scoring sys-
tem available to intensive care units (ICU) is the Acute 
Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation II (APACHE 
II), a classical tool developed to rate the severity of dis-
ease. It is usually applied within 24 hours of admission of 
adult patients to an ICU and its score varies from 0 to 
71, higher scores corresponding to more severe diseases/
higher risk of death [29]. More recently, the APACHE 
II has been replaced by the APACHE III and the Sim-
plified Acute Physiology Score II (SAPS II), whose out-
come provides a score ranging from 0 to 163 and a pre-
dicted mortality between 0% and 100% [30]. The Injury 
Severity Score (ISS) is another evaluation tool for trauma 
severity, based upon the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS), 
a system that classifies each injury in nine different body 
regions, ranging from 1 to 6 depending on the extent of 
injury. The ISS identifies six different body regions and 
its score, ranging from 1 to 75, is calculated from the 
highest AIS severity code in each of the three most se-
verely injured of these body regions. If any of the three 
AIS scores is a 6 (a not survivable injury), the ISS score is 
automatically set at 75. A major trauma is defined as the 
ISS being greater than 15 [31].
Still regarding traumas, the revised trauma score 
(RTS) is an efficient tool, objective and relatively fast 
to perform, with minimal equipment. It consists of a 
combination of results from three categories, Glasgow 
Coma Scale (GCS), systolic blood pressure (SBP) and 
respiratory rate (RR). Each category has a score rang-
ing from 0 to 4, so that the total score ranges from 0 to 
12. Such a score correlates well with the probability of 
survival of the patient. The score indicates the need for 
a more or less rapid intervention [32]. The trauma score 
– injury severity score (TRISS), instead, is a logistic re-
gression model for evaluating the outcome of trauma 
care, quantifying probability of survival as related to se-
verity of injury, by analyzing the anatomical and physi-
ological features and the age of patients [33]. This score 
comprises several parameters, including the ISS and the 
RTS. Recently, Nakahara et al. developed a simplified 
alternative logistic regression model to predict surviv-
ability of traumatic injuries [34]. The American Spinal 
Injury Association (ASIA) developed, during the 1980s, 
a classification of spinal cord injury (SCI) severity (first 
published in 1982; for a recent revision, see [35], modi-
fied from the previous Frankel classification [36]). The 
classification has a sensory and a motor component. The 
sensory component has 28 levels, evaluated through a 
3-point score, while the motor component has 10 levels, 
assessed through a 6-point score. The resultant ASIA 
impairment scale ranges from the complete impairment 
to the no impairment state.
A nOvEL APPrOACh: BEhAviOurAL 
AnD PhySiOLOgiCAL COnTinuOuS 
OBSErvATiOn OF PATiEnTS wiTh 
DiSOrDErS OF COnSCiOuSnESS
One of the priorities occurring after a brain damage is 
to assess the degree of dysfunction of the central nerv-
ous system (CNS). The best measure of the overall brain 
dysfunction is the level of consciousness as assessed 
clinically [37]. Thereafter, in order to support the clinical 
evaluation, neuroimaging techniques (such as the mag-
netic resonance imaging) and a number of coma scales 
[38] constitute a remarkable diagnostic tool. Moreover, 
behavioural and neuro-radiologic protocols – aimed at im-
proving outcome predictions [38] – are constantly being 
developed to complement classical procedures (such as 
GCS, magnetic resonance imaging and electroencepha-
lography) used to assess brain dysfunction. The level of 
consciousness itself also gives an early indication of the 
potential outcome (as stated by the Glasgow Outcome 
Scale, GOS). In general, prognosis for DOC patients may 
lead to three main different outcomes: recovery of con-
sciousness, functional recovery and mortality (see Table 1).
In this paragraph, we will focus on the results currently 
obtained through clinical assessment, neuroimaging 
techniques and various coma scales. We will then argue 
that, notwithstanding the fundamental information pro-
vided by these techniques, a novel, integrated approach, 
to be applied to the study of DOC patients, may beget 
considerable advancements.
As for clinical assessment, there are still no standard-
ised evaluation procedures for the clinical bedside exami-
nation of patients with impaired consciousness. Most cli-
nicians rely on systematic evaluations of arousal/wakeful-
ness and behavioural responses to various forms of stimu-
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lation. However, such methods have proven inadequate 
in the detection of minimal signs of responsiveness [38]. 
The bedside neurological examination of DOC patients 
should focus on the assessment of the integrity of the 
CNS (in particular, brainstem pathways and other sub-
cortical structures, mediating pupillary responses, ocular 
movements, oculovestibular reflexes, breathing patterns) 
and on the presence of (higher level) cortical functions 
(such as voluntary behaviour). More in the detail, cortical 
functioning is examined through the observation of spon-
taneous activity and the responses to external stimulation. 
The aim is to distinguish automatic or reflexive behaviours 
(reliant on spinal or subcortical pathways) from cortically-
mediated behaviours (representing a certain degree of 
awareness). This can be challenging, in particular in case 
of relatively simple behaviours, such as a finger move-
ment, and requires a certain degree of expertise (special-
ized training is essential for staff members responsible for 
providing assessment and treatment services to DOC pa-
tients), along with optimal environmental conditions. In 
general, the more a behaviour is complex, the fewer its oc-
currence is needed to demonstrate consciousness. For this 
reason, since most of the behaviours observed are simple, 
single bedside examinations are often inadequate to con-
clusively establish level of unconsciousness. As evidence of 
this, misdiagnosis is still unfortunately frequent (data col-
lected in 2006 evidenced that misdiagnoses ranged from 
15% to 43%), regardless of the constant efforts sustained 
by medical staff [38, 39].
Along with the clinical assessment of the state of 
arousal and awareness of consciousness in patients with 
severe brain damage, measurements of cerebral metabo-
lism and brain activations in response to sensory stimuli 
with positron emission tomography (PET), functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electrophysi-
ological methods can provide information on the pres-
ence, degree, and location of any residual brain function. 
MRI is very important and can reveal residual function-
alities (isolated cerebral networks may remain active in 
rare cases). Overall cerebral metabolism in MCS is de-
creased to values comparable to those observed in the 
VS [10]. fMRI and 15O-PET and can be combined with 
traditional structural MRI and electroencephalography 
(EEG) or magnetoencephalography (MEG), to offer an 
integrative view of the damaged brain [38]. Brain me-
tabolism can also be quantified in neuroimaging stud-
ies using fluorodeoxyglucose PET (FDG-PET) imaging, 
a measure of cerebral glucose metabolism rate. These 
studies revealed that overall cerebral metabolism is re-
duced by more than 50% in VS patients [38]. Laureys et 
al. also demonstrated that there is a general loss of dis-
tributed network processing and a loss of brain activation 
outside primary sensory cortices for elementary auditory 
and somatosensory stimuli in the VS [40]. In general, 
cortical functions are compromised in VS cases. Only a 
few studies have addressed patterns of brain activation 
in MCS patients. fMRI studies on MCS patients [41] 
evidenced a widespread activation of the language net-
work when exposed to auditory stimuli provided by fam-
ily members, but FDG-PET showed a marked reduction 
of resting metabolic rates near to those presented by VS 
cases. fMRI can also track emotional processing associ-
ated to the activity of the amygdala and the subcortical 
structures related to emotion, stimulated by a recording 
of the patients’ mother’s voice [38]. However, although 
metabolic and molecular studies might eventually pro-
vide useful correlates of the differences between MCS 
and VS and represent a promising avenue in the assess-
ment of patients with severe brain damage, at present 
they can only identify functionality at the most general 
level and cannot be used to advance diagnostic or prog-
nostic distinctions. Moreover, imaging studies entail is-
sues of expense and accessibility, are methodologically 
complex and need careful quantitative analysis and in-
terpretation. In addition, as for all PET studies in human 
beings, issues of radiation exposure must be considered 
and may preclude longitudinal or follow-up studies of 
these patients [10]. For these reasons, research is cur-
rently focusing on more economical and viable solutions, 
like the interesting model of EEG involving motor im-
agery to detect command-following tasks, recently devel-
oped by Cruse et al. [39].
As discussed in detail in the previous paragraph, a 
number of standardised neurobehavioural assessment 
scales were designed to provide a comprehensive over-
view of neurobehavioural functions and to measure 
the different levels of consciousness, as long as to de-
tect subtle clinical changes during the rehabilitation of 
DOC patients [38]. Notwithstanding their validity and 
reliability (for instance, the CRS-R helped considerably 
in distinguishing features of VS and MCS), the stand-
ardised measuring methods of these techniques do not 
TBI (%) Non-TBI (%)
Unconscious at least 1 month
Death 33 53 
VS 15 32 
SD 28 11 
MD 17 3 
GR 7 1
Unconscious at least 3 months
Death 35 46 
VS 30 47 
SD 19 6 
MD/GR 16 1 
Unconscious at least 6 months
Death 32 28 
VS 52 72 
SD 12 0 
MD/GR 4 0 
VS: vegetative state; SD: severe disability; MD: moderate disability; 
GR: good recovery. Adapted from [38].
Table 1
Prognosis and functional outcome according to the Glasgow 
Outcome Scale (GOS) at 1 year after prolonged unconscious-
ness in adults with traumatic brain injury (TBI) or non-trau-
matic brain injury (Non-TBI)
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allow case-specific questions to be addressed. Most of 
the standardised scales currently in use distinguish be-
havioural items between two categories, spontaneous 
and induced (a stimulus specifically provided to provoke 
a response). In general, the limited number of observa-
tions collected does not allow differentiating random 
movements from voluntary low frequency movements; 
thus, a longer behavioural observation could help recog-
nizing between voluntary and involuntary movements. 
A standardised approach is able to help recognizing the 
integrity of neurological processes, but an individual-
ized approach would be needed in order to diagnose the 
subtle differences between the VS and the MCS [38]. 
Although current research is focusing on facilitating re-
covery of consciousness, and elucidating the pathophysi-
ology underlying DOC, little is known about the neu-
rophysiologic substrate. These goals could be achieved 
favouring collaborative partnerships across rehabilitation 
centres and disciplines, such as neuroscience, biophysics, 
neurosurgery, neurology and bioethics [38].
The aim of most of the scales currently in use is to 
study some selective aspects of DOC patients at a given 
time, but no system is designed to take into account the 
condition of patients throughout the entire day. One 
possibility is to develop a scale whose behavioural items 
are derived from the main coma scales previously ex-
posed and represents the most informative parameters 
expressed by DOC patients (see Table 2). Such a scale 
could be used for the observation of the patient over 24 
hours (through video recording), for several days, both in 
the presence and absence of induced behaviours.
One of the issues related to spontaneous (non-in-
duced) behaviours is that a behaviour (shown for in-
stance by a potential MCS patient) might be a response 
unintentionally induced by any cause not easily/imme-
diately recognisable (e.g., a particular pitch of the voice, 
a nurse opening the window in the room of the patient, 
and so forth). The presence of such “hidden stimula-
tions” cannot be avoided, but increasing the time of ob-
servation can lower the weight of these biases, for the 
number of spontaneous data collected may help limit-
ing the risk of overestimating the relevance of hidden 
induced behaviours in the analysis. Spontaneous and 
induced behaviours can also be statistically compared 
between them and the prolonged time of observation 
can lead to the identification of the presence of volun-
tary behaviours, a signal indicating the transition from 
VS to MCS. Moreover, a frequent sampling may entail 
the possibility of recognising the occurrence of rare be-
havioural events, whose importance should be evaluated 
by an experienced behaviourist, since the level of statisti-
cal significance does not directly measure the magnitude 
or scientific importance of the observed result [42, 43].
Spontaneous behavioural data can be used to plot a 
circadian rhythm of the activities of the patient. Also, it is 
possible to correlate such behavioural scores with some 
of the biomedical/physiological parameters and pharma-
cological infusion measured by the apparatuses linked to 
the bed of the intensive care unit (ICU) (Table 3), and 
to adopt Cox proportional hazard model (CPHM) and 
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods [44] to 
analyse the behavioural/biomedical patterns found, so 
as to recognise the presence of behavioural/biomedical 
sequences and possibly associate them to (and conse-
quently consider them predictive of) a particular state of 
coma (VS or MCS) (see statistical analysis paragraph be-
Spontaneous (non-induced) behaviours Induced behaviours
Eye opening Eye response
Eye movements Eye tracking
Oral reflexive movements Object recognition
Vocalisation/oral movements Verbal response
Intelligible verbalisation Non-functional communication: intentional
Non-functional communication: intentional Functional communication: accurate
Functional communication: accurate Motor/limb response
Motor/limb movements Object manipulation
Abnormal posture Postural response
Table 2
Sample of behavioural items shared by the principal coma scales currently in use
Physiological parameters Pharmacological treatment
Arterial blood pressure (BP) First analgesic, e.g. Fentanest (Fentanyl)
Intracranial pressure (ICP) Second analgesic, e.g. Ultiva
Heart rate (HR) Third analgesic, e.g. Diprivan
End-tidal carbon dioxide (CO2) Curare, muscle relaxant
Temperature
Table 3
Sample of physiological parameters monitored and pharmacological infusion by ICU. The ICU measures biomedical parameters 
(mean arterial pressure, heart rate, central venous pressure, intracranial pressure, end-tidal CO2, oxygen saturation values obtained 
from pulse oximetry, temperature t1 and t2) and concentration, volume, type of medication and diffusion rates of drugs infusion
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low). To this purpose, a dedicated software and hardware 
system has already been developed (Monitoring of Vital 
Data Mo.Vi.Da.12, PRS Italia, Rome, Italy), capable of 
reading, extracting and processing the parameters col-
lected by the ICU.
It is important to mention that, even if behavioural/bi-
omedical sequences generated by MCMC methods may 
be difficult to interpret, any relevant association found 
could be a further diagnostic method for the identifica-
tion of the subtle differences that might differentiate the 
MCS from the VS, implementing the current clinical 
assessment, neurobehavioural scales and neuroimaging 
techniques and, by constructing a personal circadian 
rhythm of the DOC patient, helping to address case-
specific issues.
Statistical analysis
Overall, behaviours include all the processes used to re-
spond to internal factors and to stimuli from the physical 
and social environments. Reactions to changes in internal 
conditions, as well as to stimuli from the physical and so-
cial environments, may be expressed as simple behaviour-
al items as well as elaborate behavioural patterns. Usually, 
latencies, frequencies and durations of the behavioural 
items are scored and then analysed by applying paramet-
ric and non-parametric analyses of variance (ANOVA). 
Also, the sequences of items, and the time-points at which 
they occur, are frequently recorded. Nevertheless, by ap-
plying only ANOVA, information about the temporal 
structure of behaviour is often neglected and many results 
are missed [45]. An analysis of the temporal sequence of 
behaviour, revealing the behavioural items occurring in 
sequence, could supply additional information about the 
mechanisms and functions of behaviour.
When data consist of sequences of events and the time 
points at which they occur, the time structure of a be-
havioural pattern may be analysed by models based on 
the Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) and its 
generalisations [44], a stochastic process in which sev-
eral states are successively visited, with the “velocity” of 
switching between the states entirely described by a set 
of transition rates. The transition rate from behaviour to 
another provides distinct and additional information to 
that obtained from the frequencies and/or durations of 
those items. Anyway, behaviour is even better described 
by generalised models (semi-Markov models), because 
the CTMC model relies on the Markov assumption (the 
independency of the transmissions between behavioural 
categories from both the previous behaviour and the 
time a behavioural category has already lasted), which is 
frequently violated in behavioural studies.
Among the generalised models, the Cox proportional 
hazard model is particularly useful. The hazard function is 
the chance per unit time of occurrence of a failure, which 
in a behavioural setting corresponds to the lengths of the 
behavioural item, while the hazard function itself is the 
termination rate of a behavioural item or the transition 
rate from an item to another. The relative transition rate 
expresses the speed of switching from a behavioural item 
to another. A multilevel approach to the CTMC mod-
els, the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, 
permits the detection of the effects of treatments under 
investigation with a small number of individuals (due to 
the detailed information provided by the time-structure 
of behaviour), which is often the case of DOC patients.
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